Cracks in the axis: is Russia about to abandon ‘isolated’ Iran? | World | News
Israel’s devastating air and land assault on Iran has left Tehran- its capital city and heart of the regime – without functioning air defence systems and effectively undefended. Operation Rising Lion, launched on Friday in a race against time to prevent the Islamic Republic from building nuclear weapons, marks more than an escalation in the shadow war between both countries, however. It signals the collapse of Iran’s fragile strategic partnership with Russia.
Backed by Mossad intelligence, Israeli Defence Forces launched drones from inside Iran to disable radar and missile sites around the capital before moving in with airstrikes. Four major systems were destroyed: the SA-69 (S-300 derivative), SA-68 (Mersad), SA-71 (Raad), and SA-63 (Khordad).
But the consequences of these attacks go beyond the battlefield.
Tehran’s strategic reliance on Russia – for both military kit and international cover – is now in freefall.
Despite Iran’s years of military and diplomatic support Russia, overstretched by its commitments in Ukraine,has been unable to replace Iran’s S-300 air defence batteries since the last remaining three were destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in October.
A plan to attempt to repair the platforms came and went without result.
Publicly, the Islamic regime issued statements that it no longer needed Russian assets because it was capable of providing its own.
But privately, according to sources in Tehran, the fact that it took Russia‘s MFA 12 hours to issue a statement condemning the Israeli attack has not gone unnoticed.
The Iranian regime had leaned on the Russia relationship to dispel domestic perceptions of isolation.
Unlike China, which trades with Iran on a purely transactional basis, the Tehran–Moscow axis had projected a sense of mutual strategic interest.
That illusion may now be gone.
“Iran bailed Russia out in 2022 and 2023 when it came to drone warfare,” said Dr Efrat Sopher of the Ezri Center in Haifa.
But Moscow’s domestic production of Shahed drones under licence has significantly reduced its dependency on Iranian supply.
“Now Russia doesn’t need them anymore,” she added.
Professor Mark Galeotti, a leading expert on Russian security affairs, agreed:
“From the Russians’ point of view, Iran is now less useful. Tehran is peeved, but it doesn’t have leverage anymore.”
Mutual need has never replaced an inherent mutual distrust which lingered, anchored in history, between Tehran and Moscow.
While Russia‘s intervention in Syria ostensibly meant supporting Bashar Assad’s ally, Iran, the suspicion in Tehran was always that Russia‘s presence was designed to ensure Iranian influence could be contained.
Iranian officials, insiders say, were alarmed when Putin offered to intercede with Trump on their behalf.
“They feared he’d sell them down the river to get concessions over Ukraine,” said Galeotti.
“These have always been alliances of convenience. And this convenience is fading.”
These included a shared interest in the Caucasus, where Russian inattention after its invasion of Ukraine has, ironically, led to the rise of China as main challenger.
Russia might have found itself duty-bound to try to ntervene on Iran’s behalf with Israel, had Tehran acted on its 2007 invitation to join the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a Russia-led military bloc with a mutual defence clause.
But the Ayatollahs rejected inclusion to a group dominated by a historical rival. Given Russia’s current inability to offer meaningful intervention today, it is just as well.
Into this increasingly precarious equation comes the nuclear question.
Iran has long maintained its nuclear programme as a hedge against isolation, according to Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
At the end of 2023, the Islamic Republic sat at the top of the “axis of resistance”, which included its proxies Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
But Israeli retaliation for the Hamas-led October 7 attacks has led to the elimination of Hezbollah and the severe downgrading of Hamas as effective fighting forces.
The loss of Syria – a vital supply route for Hezbollah – was the final death knell in Iran’s regional ambitions: the creation of a so-called Shi’a crescent and ring of steel around Israel.
Now what remains is the disparate “axis of aggression” consisting of Russia, China and North Korea,
“The regime occupies a unique position as the weakest of the anti-American states and the only non-nuclear one,” added Taleblu.
“And this tells you why they have kept the nuclear drive so long. It’s the only thing they can rely on. It’s the only thing that will buy them an invitation to the big table and secure the regime the two things it craves most: status and security.”
In 2023 Russia was forced by its need for Iran to support Hamas.
And it paid a heavy price: its previously close relationship with Israel was terminated, and Jerusalem is now donating Patriot missile systems to Ukraine.
But today, it is Russia which holds the cards.
“The days when a strong Iran could push Russia into supporting Hamas are gone now,” said Prof Galeotti.
“Russia has cranked up their economy into a proper war-fighting state. It can afford to walk away.”
In the meantime, Vladimir Putin is desperate to leverage Trump away from Ukraine.
It is telling, says Galeotti, that much of the time in their last meeting was dedicated to the issue of Iran.
“Russia might now choose to distance itself from Tehran in order to reclaim its regional influence,” he said.
“Putin is good at driving the conversation off topic when it suits him.
“He knows he has to offer Trump something – if that can’t be in Ukraine, a classic solution is to expand to something laterally.
“He still holds key intel on Iran’s nuclear programme. He knows where the entrances are to the bunkers, and even the radar frequencies for the remaining few air defence systems which Israel hasn’t destroyed.
“He could use that to gain concessions over Ukraine or even as a way back into Israel’s good graces.”
What remains unknown is whether Tehran will publicly acknowledge this shift – or continue to act as if Moscow remains its partner.
But the strike has forced a reckoning.
“Iran can’t turn around and change course without some form of regime re-profiling,” Galeotti concluded.
“They’ve been left exposed. And everyone knows it.”
