Kursk invasion has rattled Putin and transformed the narrative of the war in Ukraine | World | News

When Britain’s Challenger 2 main battle tanks first rolled off production lines in Leeds and Tyneside in 1994, the idea that any might one day invade Russia was beyond unthinkable.

Nevertheless, this month some of the 14 Challengers the UK supplied to the Ukrainian government last year are reported to have done just that by helping to spearhead its unexpected thrust into Russia’s heartland province of Kursk.

In 1943, the Kursk region was the scene of one of the largest-ever tank battles, finally turning back the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union launched almost two years earlier.

Whether this summer’s battles will be quite so monumental is hard to say for now. What is clear, however, is that President Volodymyr Zelensky and his top commanders decided taking the fight to Russia was the best way to redefine a war that they were increasingly seen as slowly losing.

According to the Biden administration, the US government was not notified in advance of Ukraine’s plans. Ukraine has long required permission from Washington and other allies to use the long-range rockets they have provided to strike into Russian territory. But when it came to using US and European-provided armoured vehicles for their ground assault into Russia, the Ukrainian authorities appear to have decided it would be better to seek forgiveness than to ask permission.

On Sunday, Zelensky called the captured Russian territory a “buffer zone”, describing it and the more than 1,000 reportedly captured Russian military personnel as part of an “exchange fund” that would make it easier for Ukraine to get back its own prisoners and secure other concessions.

“Everything that inflicts losses on the Russian army, Russian state, their military-industrial complex and their economy helps prevent the war from expanding and brings us closer to a just end to this aggression,” Zelensky said, calling on the US, France and Britain to step up weapons and supplies.

Since winning the General Election in July, Sir Keir Starmer’s Government has signalled that supporting Ukraine will remain a top priority. But Britain has now given a significant amount of the weaponry it can – including all its AS-90 armoured artillery pieces – and would reportedly need further permission from the US, France and an unnamed European state to allow its Storm Shadow missiles to be used in the current Kursk offensive.

As the war continues, Ukraine hopes to use its own tech industry and Western support to build artificial intelligence-enabled drone swarms to prevent further Russian advance and make up for their own shortage of combat troops. But that technology is not yet working – and while Ukraine’s pilot-operated “first person viewer” drones have been valuable in Kursk, the heart of the offensive has been a much more traditional matter of soldiers, tanks, initial secrecy and speed.

The Zelensky government is now heavily focused on the US presidential vote and what that means, as well as maximising support from European allies. Ukrainian officials want to get more European soldiers training Ukrainians within their borders – but while Britain has sent a small number of advisers, larger detachments of UK troops are seen a step too far for now.

Ukraine had made it clear it hopes to humiliate Putin, making him the first Russian leader to lose territory to a foreign invader since the Second World War. Throughout the conflict, Russian leader and pro-Kremlin voices have warned that any significant attack on Russia might provoke a nuclear response – but have been much quieter on that front since the Kursk offensive.

That should not be a surprise – since the first year of the war, sources say the Biden administration has been increasingly upfront with its threats so that even a single use of a tactical atomic device by Putin would prompt a devastating conventional US strike on Russia’s military.

While it continues to support Russia in other ways including purchasing its oil and gas, China has also made it clear it is strongly opposed to any nuclear escalation.

Putin likely has too much to lose by risking that, but he and his commanders will be looking for other ways to counter the attack. Such a response could come elsewhere in the world – Russia has successfully supported coups in several West African nations in the last two years, and might also encourage its ally Iran to distract the West with a wider Middle-East conflict.

In the meantime, though, Ukraine looks like it is winning for the first time since early 2023 – and that alone gives it an advantage with some important audiences.

For much of this year, Ukrainian officials have also looked nervously at US presidential candidate Donald Trump and his pledges to end the war by forcing a peace settlement on Kyiv. Seizing an “exchange fund” of Russian territory and prisoners helps Ukraine shape its destiny should that happen – but so does looking like a “winner” not a “loser”, which is famously how Trump often sees the world.

Ukrainians have often had other nations decide their fate, and the Zelensky government has made it clear it does not want that to happen now – even if many Ukrainian officials and analysts acknowledge eventual compromise is likely.

In July, as Trump stormed ahead in the opinion polls following the failed assassination attempt against him and Biden’s disastrous debate performance, Ukraine sent its Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba to explore what Ukraine called “China’s possible role in achieving a stable and just peace”.

In Kyiv, government officials began suggesting they might be ready for a deal – and would rather cut one now with Beijing than wait for Trump. As those talks were underway, Biden pulled out of the race and opinion polls shifted at once towards new Democrat contender Vice President Kamala Harris. Within days, Ukrainian officials were reasserting their commitment to maintaining the country’s official prewar borders, hopeful of sustained US support if Harris wins the White House.

Ukraine’s eastern and central European supporters are particularly keen that Kyiv keeps on fighting – should a ceasefire be declared, they worry Russia may retool its military and attempt to humiliate and split the Nato alliance by taking a chunk of Eastern Europe, potentially part of one of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania.

Within Washington itself, there are now two major schools of thought on supporting Ukraine. One argues that the more resolve the US shows now in keeping Ukraine fighting, the more it will deter other potential adversaries from attacking other US allies – most importantly China on Taiwan.

US intelligence believes Chinese leader Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to attack Taiwan by 2027, but has not yet made a firm decision.

Preparing the US military for that conflict is now the top priority for the Pentagon – and the second school of US thought argues that too much support for Ukraine or European allies is a distraction and misuse of scarce resources.

That latter argument is particularly popular amongst those close to Trump. But there is also little clarity over how a Harris administration might approach Ukraine, particularly if she chooses to move on from the senior foreign policy advisers used by Biden.

The approach of mainland European nations is also undetermined. Earlier in the year, French President Emmanuel Macron was the loudest voice in Europe calling for military trainers within Ukraine itself – but he has gone quiet on that point since his centrist bloc performed poorly in snap elections.

Things are also messy with Germany, which despite its caution over initial weapons shipments such as Leopard tanks and ongoing refusal to deliver powerful Taurus missiles had become Europe’s largest supplier of military aid to Kyiv. This week, however, saw reports that further support would be suspended as part of the Berlin government’s effort to balance its budget.

In June, Ukraine began accession talks with the European Union – achieving more progress than on its other long-term ambition to join Nato, which the US and other members have vetoed while the war continues. But to take advantage of that diplomatic progress, Ukraine must survive the winter.

Russian strikes on Ukraine’s power infrastructure are just one attempt to make that harder. Both Ukraine and Russia have long struggled with ageing, shrinking populations – but Ukraine’s lack of young people is the more acute, and Russia’s larger population and oil revenue have allowed Putin to keep hiring contract soldiers to keep fighting in Ukraine.

By invading the Kursk region – and critically retaining the element of surprise in its attack – Ukraine put its limited number of battle-hardened soldiers up against weaker Russian lines and barely trained young conscripts, a deliberate move that will increase domestic pressure against Putin.

It has also proved better than the Kremlin at rapidly mobilising the latest drone technology and using electronic warfare to jam Russian systems – but that is an ongoing game of cat and mouse, with war-winning technology one month rendered obsolete the next.

Russia is also able to call on resources from North Korea, Iran and increasingly from China, while Western weapons manufacturers are struggling to keep pace with supply.

The Kursk offensive, though, has reignited Ukrainian morale – and that is a valuable thing in war.

How this conflict ends will likely shape the world for years to come, and the Kyiv government clearly still believes there is much to play for.

Deterring Armageddon: A Biography of NATO by Peter Apps (Wildfire, £25) is out now. For free UK P&P, visit expressbookshop.com or call Express Bookshop on 020 3176 3832